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Plaintiff/Appellant and cross-Appellee Gary E. Reed ("Reed"), respectfully submits the 
following reply brief. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-l - 78-31a-20 (1985) (the "Utah Arbitration Act") 
§ 78-31a-3: A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to 
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds 
existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is 
alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
§ 78-31a-4: (1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an 
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is 
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope 
of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those 
issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
§ 78-31a-19: An appeal may be taken by any aggrieved party as provided by law for 
appeals in civil actions from any court order: 
(1) denying a motion to compel arbitration; 
ARGUMENT 
In addition to responding to the three issues raised by Mr. Reed in his appeal, the District 
has cross-appealed as to one additional issue: whether the grievance procedure constitutes an 
arbitration agreement subject to the Utah Arbitration Act. In the interest of efficiency, Mr. Reed 
responds to this newly raised issue, together with the issues raised by Mr. Reed, in this Reply 
Brief. 
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I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DISTRICT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS. 
As established in Mr. Reed's opening brief, a Motion to Dismiss was not a proper 
response to a Motion to Compel Arbitration, and the trial court erred in granting the District's 
motion. A motion to compel arbitration does not constitute an action — like a Complaint -
which requires the pleading of a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rather, a Motion to 
Compel Arbitration seeks only an order that the parties shall arbitrate. Furthermore, as 
discussed at length in the opening brief, the District did not meet the burden of such a Motion 
in any event. Indeed, a Motion to Compel Arbitration, pursuant to statute, need set forth only 
one fact - the existence of an arbitration agreement, to properly overcome a motion to dismiss. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1993). Mr. Reed's verified Motion plainly set forth the 
existence of an arbitration agreement.1 Thus, the trial court erred in looking beyond the facts 
as pled in Mr. Reed's Motion to Compel Arbitration. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PROFESSIONAL 
AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT. 
In bringing a cross-appeal, the District raises one new issue not raised in Mr. Reed's 
original appeal: whether the Professional Agreement that governs the parties' employment 
contains an arbitration provision that is subject to the Utah Arbitration Act. The District 
contends that the Professional Agreement is not subject to the provisions of the Utah Arbitration 
Act because it provides only a grievance procedure and not a mechanism for binding arbitration. 
1
 In addition, the trial court correctly concluded that an arbitration agreement in fact 
existed. 
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In support of its position, the District makes essentially two arguments. First, the District 
maintains that there is no right to arbitrate pursuant to the Professional Agreement because it 
nowhere contains the word "arbitrate." Second, relying on an Oregon case, the District argues 
that no arbitration agreement exists within the Professional Agreement because the grievance 
procedure contained in that agreement is not final and binding. Neither argument is persuasive. 
A. An Arbitration Agreement Need not Contain the Word "Arbitrate." 
While the grievance procedure contained within the professional agreement nowhere 
contains the word "arbitrate," it clearly evinces an intent by both parties to submit disputes 
thereunder to arbitration. The grievance procedure sets forth several steps that an employee 
should take to invoke arbitration. Section 5.4.1 of the Professional Agreement provides that, 
first, a complainant is to attempt informal discussions with his principal or immediate supervisor. 
If such discussions do not resolve any grievance, then four formal steps may be taken pursuant 
to section 5.4.2. 
Step one allows an employee to invoke the formal procedure by sending a written form 
to "the principal or immediate supervisor." Prof. Agreement at 50. "If the educator is not 
satisfied with the disposition of the grievance at Step 1," he may forward his complaint to the 
Superintendent of Schools pursuant to Step 2. See Prof. Agreement at 51. Step 3 provides as 
follows: 
Step 3: If the educator is not satisfied with the decision rendered in Step 2, the educator 
... may submit the grievance to a hearing examiner .... 
Prof. Agreement at 51. Step 3 goes on to describe the process for selecting a hearing examiner. 
Finally, Step 4 provides as follows: 
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Step 4: If the educator is not satisfied with the decision rendered in Step 3, the educator 
and/or his/her chosen representative may request and be granted a hearing before the 
Board of Education in executive session. Following an executive session, the Board will 
render its decision in an open meeting.... 
Prof. Agreement at 51. 
It is difficult to imagine how a contract could more clearly set forth an arbitration 
procedure. Whether the procedure is labeled a grievance or arbitration, it is subject to a final 
determination by a body acting as an arbitrator of the dispute. The District's semantical 
distinction simply is unpersuasive. To accept the District's argument in this regard would be 
similar to finding that no binding contract exists because the parties to the contract chose to use 
the word "agreement" rather than "contract." It is settled that courts look not to the form or 
labels by which parties choose to title their agreements, but to the substance of the agreement. 
In this case, the substance clearly calls for an arbitration process. 
B. The Procedure Contained in the Professional Agreement is Final and Binding. 
The District also argues that the grievance procedure contained in the Professional 
Agreement is not final and binding and, therefore, cannot constitute an arbitration agreement. 
The District points to the last sentence of Step 4, which provides as follows: 
Nothing herein shall be construed to limit the right of the District or the educator to 
appeal to an appropriate court of law. 
Prof. Agreement at 51. The District also cites an Oregon case holding that a contract between 
a school district and its employees contained no arbitration agreement because the procedure was 
not final and binding. See Van Eck v. Oregon State Employees Ass'n. 574 P.2d 633 (Or. 
1978). Not only is Van Eck not controlling, it is inapposite to this situation and is not 
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persuasive. In Van Eck, the procedure was in fact binding only on the association and the 
employees were free to seek any available remedy after having followed all available 
administrative steps. That is simply not the case here. 
Step 4 of the grievance procedure clearly indicates that the procedure is binding on both 
parties. The District has pointed to the right to appeal to an appropriate court of law, as set 
forth in Step 4, as somehow negating the binding nature of the arbitration process. The fact that 
the procedure allows an appeal does not make the procedure any less binding than the final order 
of any trial court would be simply because it may be appealed. 
m. PUBLIC POLICY MANDATES THAT ANY DOUBTS REGARDING 
ARBITRABILITY BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION. 
The District maintains that Mr. Reed waived his right to arbitration. No such waiver has 
occurred. To the contrary, Reed has acted in a manner consistent with his clear intent aot to 
waive his right to arbitration. 
It is well settled in Utah, as in other jurisdictions, that public policy strongly favors 
arbitration. Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah. 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992). 
Public policy not only approves but encourages arbitration as a method of settling disputes 
because it generally is less expensive and eases court congestion. Id. Accordingly, any doubt 
concerning arbitrability ought to be resolved in favor of arbitration. Given the strong public 
policy favoring arbitration, the right to arbitrate is not to be waived unless the intent to waive 
is clear. Red Skv Homeowners Ass'n v. Heritage Cove. 701 P.2d 603, 604 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1984). 
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Under Utah law, it is also well settled that waiver does not occur absent voluntary 
relinquishment of a known right. E.g.. Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 
P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) (rejecting previous, more specific, statements of the rule of waiver in 
favor of this general statement - which is to be applied to each case on its facts). In other 
words, the waiving party must (1) clearly know of the rights which will be waived by this 
action; and (2) voluntarily and intentionally relinquish such rights. Furthermore, such 
relinquishment must be clearly intended under the facts of the case. Id. at 941; see also Hunter 
v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) ("[T]o constitute waiver, one's actions or conduct 
must be distinctly made, must evince in some unequivocal manner an intent to waive, and must 
be inconsistent with any other intent.").2 
2As noted in Mr. Reed's opening brief, the Utah Supreme Court recently clarified (and likely 
overruled) the standard as set forth in Hunter. The Court, however, went on to state that "the 
Hunter language was not inappropriate under the facts of that case ... [but] went well beyond 
the elements of proof [relevant to waiver]." Soter's, 857 P.2d at 940. The Soter's Court went 
on to hold "that a fact finder . . . assess the totality of the circumstances to determine whether 
the relinquishment is clearly intended." Id. at 941. 
Soter's further provides that prior statements of the rule that rely on application of rules 
of waiver in specific types of cases or under specific facts should no longer be followed. 
Rather, the general principle — that to constitute waiver, one must voluntarily relinquish a 
known right — is to be applied to specific facts. The court went on to explain: 
This general statement of the proof that is necessary to show 
intentional relinquishment is all the specification that we think appropriate. 
Beyond this, the appellate courts of this state need not attempt to articulate 
as general principles the specific facts that are required to show intentional 
relinquishment in particular cases. Over time, factual patterns may emerge 
from affirmances and reversals of specific decisions that may serve to flesh 
out the law, but that does not require repeated reformulation of the general 
statement.. . . In fact, such attempts at reformulation can be detrimental, 
as the history of appellate case law since Hunter demonstrates. 
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The "evidence" upon which the District relies in arguing waiver does not establish that 
Mr. Reed voluntarily relinquished his right to arbitration. Application of strong public policy 
considerations to the facts of this case weigh heavily in favor of this Court ordering the District 
to submit to arbitration as clearly provided under the Agreement between Mr. Reed and the 
District. 
IV. MR. REED HAS NOT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ARBITRATION IN ANY 
EVENT. 
The District has failed meet its "burden of establishing [both] substantial participation and 
prejudice" as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. Chandler. 833 P.2d at 358. 
Reed's actions prior to filing his Motion to Compel Arbitration do not rise to a level constituting 
"substantial participation" in litigation to a point inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. In 
addition, even assuming his actions constituted substantial participation in litigation, which they 
did not, the District has not been prejudiced. 
Id. at 941. In discussing the evolution away from this general standard, the Court stated: 
[W]e think that the error resulted from the rather random movement in our 
law of waiver away from pure legal requirements toward a description of 
facts that seemed important in particular situations in determining whether the 
legal requirements of waiver were met. Unfortunately, we and the court of 
appeals tended to elevate to statements of general application what amounted to 
case-bound determinations of factual sufficiency. 
Id. at 941. In other words, the general statement of the principle of waiver does not change 
depending on the context (e.g., arbitration). Rather the principle remains constant. Waiver has 
occurred only if, under the facts of the case, an intentional relinquishment of a known right has 
occurred. 
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A. Mr. Reed has not Substantially Participated in Litigation. 
In Chandler, the Court found that Blue Cross (the party seeking arbitration) had, prior 
to filing a motion seeking to compel arbitration, filed an answer and a cross complaint and had 
participated in five months of extensive formal discovery. The Court held that by participating 
in such extensive discovery — discovery which would not have been available in arbitration --
Blue Cross clearly had manifested its intent to proceed to trial. Thus, the Chandler court held 
that Blue Cross' action satisfied the first prong of the test. 
Mr. Reed, on the other hand, has engaged in no discovery. Indeed, although he filed 
a formal Complaint against the District, he dismissed the Complaint before the District filed an 
answer. Reed's actions were at the beginning point on the litigation continuum. Certainly they 
did not rise to either "substantial participation" or to the inconsistency point. Reed's actions in 
dismissing his Complaint under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 41 manifest not an intent to waive 
arbitration, but rather just the opposite. Furthermore, it is important to note that at the time 
Reed filed the Complaint, the District already had refused to act on his attempt at arbitration. 
[Record at 127-132; see Fact 4 in Opening Brief and Exhibit B.] Indeed, prior to taking any 
other action. Mr. Reed attempted to invoke the arbitration procedures set forth in the 
Professional Agreement by letter dated September 19, 1992. fSee Opening Brief, Exhibit B.] 
It was only when the District failed to respond in any way to Mr. Reed's attempt at arbitration 
that he pursued additional avenues. In short, the first prong of the Chandler test has not been 
satisfied in this case. 
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The District's likening of Mr. Reed's GRAMA request to formal discovery is equally 
unavailing. Unlike formal discovery, any information available to Mr. Reed under GRAMA 
would equally be available to him under an arbitration process. Indeed, under Utah law, any 
member of the public can, at any time, request access to public records pursuant to GRAMA. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201 (1992). A GRAMA request simply does not equate to formal 
discovery. 
B. The District has not been Prejudiced. 
The second prong that must be established in order to find waiver of arbitration under 
Chandler is a finding of prejudice to the party opposing arbitration. As set forth in the opening 
brief, no prejudice exists in this case. Indeed, the District is unable to establish prejudice under 
any of the three examples cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. First, Mr. Reed has 
gained no advantage through participation in pre-trial procedures. Unlike the party in Board of 
Education, Taos Municipal School v. The Architects. Taos. 709 P.2d 184, 186 (N.M. 1985), 
Mr. Reed has not availed himself of any discovery process "which would have been lost under 
arbitration." iaos« 709 P.2d at 186. No discovery has occurred between Reed and the District, 
and certainly none that would have been lost under arbitration. 
Similarly, the District is unable to establish prejudice under the Utah Supreme Court.s 
second example; i.e., that "the party seeking arbitration is attempting to forum shop after 'the 
judicial waters [have]. . . been tested.'" Chandler. 833 P.2d at 359. As stated in Wood v. 
Miller's National Insurance Co.. 632P.2d 1163, 1165-66 (N.M. 1981), relied upon by the Utah 
Supreme Court in support of its second example of prejudice: 
(r\app-rep tew cjt) 9 
The instigation of legal action is not determinative for purposes of deciding 
whether a party has waived arbitration. The point of no return is reached when 
the party seeking to compel arbitration invokes the court's discretionary power, 
prior to demanding arbitration, on a question other than its demand for 
arbitration. 
Wood, 632 P.2d at 1165-66 (emphasis added); see also Bernalillo City Medical Center 
Employees v. Cancelosi, 587 P.2d 960, 963 (N.M. 1978) (the case was not at issue and since 
no hearings have been held, the judicial waters had not been tested prior to the time the motion 
for arbitration had been filed). Mr. Reed has not invoked or sought to invoke the discretionary 
powers of any court prior to the filing of the Motion to Compel Arbitration. The judicial waters 
simply have not been tested. 
Finally, Mr. Reed has not caused the District "to undergo the types of expenses that 
arbitration is designed to alleviate." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359. In support of this third 
example, the Chandler court cited several cases in which the opposing party had incurred 
significant expenses during a formal discovery process. Id. at 359 n.16; see also, e.g.. Price 
v. Drexell Burnham Lambert. Inc.. 791 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that defendant 
initiated extensive discovery without demanding arbitration). Taos. 709 P.2d at 185 (same). The 
court did not cite, nor did it rely upon, any case wherein the opposing party had not been 
subjected to substantial formal discovery expense. The District has presented only inadmissible 
evidence of having incurred expense and, even then, has wholly failed to establish that it 
otherwise would have avoided such purported expense under arbitration. 
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In short, Reed has gained no advantage, procedurally or otherwise, by filing and then 
voluntarily dismissing a lawsuit prior to his Motion to Compel Arbitration. In addition, unlike 
the example cited by the Utah Supreme Court in Chandler. Reed has not engaged in forum 
shopping. No court ever has exercised its discretionary power with regard to this case. The 
District has suffered no prejudice as defined by the Utah Supreme Court. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN FAILING TO STRIKE, AND IN 
RELYING UPON INADMISSIBLE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN. THE 
AFFIDAVITS OF FELSHAW KING AND MEL MILES, 
The District claims that even if the court should have stricken portions of the affidavits 
of Felshaw King and Mel Miles, its failure to do so was harmless. In essence, the District 
argues that Reed suffered no harm from the court's reliance on such affidavits in that (1) Reed 
admitted some of the same facts in his opening brief, (2) "statements contained in the Affidavits 
did nothing more than supplement the arguments made by the School District, or (3) the 
statements in the Affidavits were made on the basis of personal knowledge." Appellee Brief at 
23. 
These arguments are unpersuasive, particularly in light of the fact that the affidavits were 
offered and considered in support of the District's so-called motion to dismiss ~ requiring all 
facts to be frozen as stated in the pleadings on record. In addition, there are several obvious 
problems with the District's logic. First, Mr. Reed has not admitted any facts that correspond 
to objections to statements in the affidavits. In addition, perhaps the most important and 
prejudicial "fact" supported only in the affidavits is the claim that the District has expended 
substantial amounts of money in responding to Mr. Reed's claimed discrimination. No 
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discovery has been conducted on this issue and it is impossible for Mr. Reed to dispute or admit 
any such statements. Affidavits offered in support of a motion to dismiss that are immune from 
attack do not become admissible by a statement that they are "made on personal knowledge" or 
that they merely "supplemented the arguments" espoused by movant. Indeed, while it may be 
permissible to introduce evidence in support of a motion to dismiss (thus automatically 
converting it into a motion for summary judgment), such evidence will not carry the day where 
it is still contrary to facts as plead unless beyond any genuine dispute. The District's facts 
clearly are not beyond any genuine dispute. Finally, "evidence" set forth in the form of affidavit 
testimony is irrelevant because there is no evidence from, or even allegation by, the District that 
it would have avoided any expense it allegedly has incurred were it to be required to submit to 
arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court affirm the trial 
court's decision that the Professional Agreement contains an arbitration agreement subject to the 
Utah Arbitration Act. Mr. Reed further requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
determination of waiver and remand this case and instruct the trial court to enter an order 
compelling the District to submit to arbitration with Mr. Reed. 
// 
// 
// 
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